Naval War College Review
Volume 3
Number 4 April

Article 2

1950

Strategic Employment of the Navy; Past, Present
and Future
Donald B. Beary
U.S. Navy

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Beary, Donald B. (1950) "Strategic Employment of the Navy; Past, Present and Future," Naval War College Review: Vol. 3 : No. 4 ,
Article 2.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Beary: Strategic Employment of the Navy; Past, Present and Future

RESTRICTED

STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE NAVY;
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
An address delivered by

'Vice Admiral Donald B. Beary, U.S.N.
at the National' War College
16 February, 1950

General Bull and Officers of the National War College, I

consider it a distinct honor to be invited to address such a highly

selected group of officers. I must admit, however, that I was some
what confounded when I received the suggested topic for my re
marks, which was "Strategic Employment of the Navy; Past,
Present and future". We have in our library many thousands of
volumes covering the subject and to think that I could summarize
them in a fifty minute talk is somewhat overcoming. However, i
will try to give some of the most important points, generally con
fining my remarks to World Wars I and II and future employment of
the Navy.

The basic fundamental mission of the Navy in the past and it
will continue to be so in the future is to gain and maintain con
trol of the sea lanes vital to our war effort and to deny to the en
emy the sea lanes vital to him.
By April 6, 1917, when we entered World War I, the Brit

ish Navy had contained, though not destroyed, the German surface
Navy, and our contribution to this containment was the sending of
the 6th Battleship Division to·augment the British fleet. Our prin
cipal effort was expended in combating the enemy submarines. You
all know the outcome. As far as the Navy was concerned, the war
was between surface and sub-surface craft. Shipborne air did not
enter into it.
Vice Admiral Be�ry is President of the Naval War College.
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During the period from the end of the war until. 1933 we
witnessed the rapid disintegration of our navy through armament

limitation agreements and drastic curtailment of funds. Ship con
struction practically ceased; research and development were seri
ously curtailed and non-existent in that m:ost important develop
ment which, though hampered by limited funds, made progress, and
in March 1922 we had our first aircraft carrier, the converted col:
lier, LANGLEY.

The period from 1933 to 1941, when we suddenly found our

selves in a war on two fronts, witnessed the slow but gradual build- .
up of our navy, including destroyers, cruisers, battleships and car
riers. The tempo increased with the rapid deterioration of the
world international situation until the Japs bombed Pearl Har
bor, when the sky was the limit.

Though the Navy suffered terrific losses at Pearl Harbor,
we were lucky 'in one respect and that was that not one of the
seven aircraft carriers in commission was damaged. W-e had been
knocked to our knees but were not out.
Our basic military strategy as approved by the President was

that initia�ly our major military effort would be made in the Euro
pean theater, while holding or defensive operations were con
ducted in the Pacific.

We had lost control of the seas. Our
Navy had been so seriously crippled and was so definitely inferior in
power to the Jap Navy that there was no other answer. There-·
fore, until the Navy could accomplish its mission of. regaining and

maintaining the control of the sea lanes essential to the conduct
of the war we had to assume a defensive position.

As in World War I by the time we entered the war the

British Fleet had contained the German surface Navy, which re

quired an all out effort on its part; therefore the Japanese Navy

2
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became our sole responsibility and we were not in a position to meet

it head on. The best we could do was to conduct a few raids, hit and

run operations.

However, the extremely rapid advance of the Japs south

ward through New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, which vitally

threatened our line of communications with Australia, forced us
to do something drastic to stop them.

This something was the Battle of the Coral Seas on the 7th

of May, 1942, followed by the Battle of Midway on June 4th, 1942,

We sustained losses in these two battles but the enemy was so

severely punished that her great superiority was reduced almost to
equality with us.

Our strength was growing rapidly.

New con

struction and trained personnel to man our ships and planes were

being produced at a rate the enemy could not equal.
our way to gaining control of the seas.

We were on

On August 7, 1942, we landed on Guadalcanal and, though
the fighting was bitter and we took heavy losses, we stuck.

The

southward movement of the Japs was stopped, and we were now in
a position to start the long drive to Tokyo.

The grand strategy for this campaign consisted of two major
efforts: 1st, a drive northward under command of General Mac
Arthur, through New Guinea to the Philippines; and 2nd, a drive
westward under Admiral Nimitz to Okinawa.

After these pre

liminary objectives were seized and consolidated they were to be the
jumping off places for the final assault on Japan.

Fortunately,

after we had seized them the Japanese sued for peace on August
15, 1945, and the final step, the invasion of Japan, was not neces

sary.
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The above plan of campaign required the use of. amphibious
operations on a scale never attempted before. The prerequisit�
for success of these operations was control of the vital sea lane�,
including control of the air over them. It required the accomplish�
ment of something which many people said could not be done and
that was that ship-based air power could not successfully �mbat
and neutralize shore-based air power. The Navy did it.
/

i -

So much for the first part of the Navy's mission, that is, the
gaining of control of the sea lanes vital to ou.r efforts. How about '
the second part, that is, denying to the enemy the sea lanes vital
to hitn?
From December 7, 1941, until the end of the war our sub
marines did an outstanding job and accounted for the major effort
in this regard assisted by occasional air and surface raids. With our
seizure of the Philippines and Okinawa the long essential life line of
the Japanese to Malaya and Indonesia was cut and the Japanese
had lost the war through inability to support her military forces
and feed her people.
They started the war with about 7,000,000 tons of merchant
shipping. They captured and built about 3,000,000 tons during the
war, which gave them a total of about 10,000,000 tons. At war's
end they had only about 1,500,000 tons left and only 750,000 tons of
this was operable. There were only about 500,000 barrels of fuel
oil left in all Japan, so you can readily see how effectively we had
cut their vital sea lanes. As a matter of comparison our fast
carrier task force used as much as 140,000 barrels of fuel oil per
day. In other words, the Japanese had only three days supply of
oil left on VJ day based on our consumption rate.
This forcibly demonstrates that a nation's sea power is com
posed not only of her combatant ship strength but of equal im4
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portance is her merchant shipping.
regarded.

This fact is frequently dis

So much for our naval strategy during World War II in the
Pacific. Turning to the Atlantic, as I have said before, the Brit

ish had contained, though not destroyed, the German surface Navy
by the time we entered the war. The fight in that theatre was
against their submarines. It was a tough battle and at one time was
almost lost, but with the great improvement in detection devices,
the tremendous increase in the numbers of escort vessels, the in
troduction of "Hunter-Killer" tactics and more effective use of
land-based air, we, the British and ourselves, were able to suc
cessfully combat the German submarines and maintain control of
the seas.

The lesson we have learned from two world wars is that the
submarine is a most important threat to our control of the seas,
and that the introduction of faster under-water speeds and ability
to run submerged for long periods of time have greatly increased
the difficulties of successfully combating them. In my opinion it
is the most important problem that confronts the Navy. It is one
which must be solved and will require all the brains, talent and
money we can get to solve it. I will refer to this later.

So much for the strategy and mission of the Navy during

the past two great wars.
our Navy?

What about the future employment of

There is a vociferous, fanatical group of people in this

country, who unfortunately receive more attention than their cause

deserves, who say that air power has sunk the Navy and ships that
sail on the surface of the seas. This is not true and all history re

futes it. Some of these same fanatics say, "We don't care any
thing about history; we make it." I cannot believe that any sound,
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logical, sane, educated person would make such a statement or be,.
lieve such a thing.
All progress that man has madein whatever form of�science,
engineering, art, living, government, etc., is a direct result of past
trials and.errors and·suceesses. Naval science is no exception. The
wise man learns and profits from the past and applies his knowledge
to the present and the future.
The end of World War II brought about a situation in
naval affairs that had its most recent parallel during the Napoleonic
Wars. At that time Napoleon had organized the States of West
ern Europe jnto a continental alliance that was opposed by a single
dominant sea power-Great Britain. After the defeat of the Com
bined Fleet at Trafalgar, Europe faced a long period during which
the naval strength of the continental powers could be employed
only in the ''guerre de course"-war upon commerce.i The "guerre
de course" is the classic weapon of the weaker sea power, but it
will not win wars. After Trafalgar, England bottled up what was
left of. the French Fleet in its home ports by means· of blockade,
and her sea power was opposed only by such scattered forces as
were able to skirt the blockade and prey on British merchant ship
ping. Thus, absolute sea power, in a manner of speaking, was op
posed to absolute land power. But the dominant sea power was
without the physical means to settle the issue on the, continent;
she lacked the resources in -fuen and material necessary . to prose
cute land warfare on a large scale. And her continental adversary
could not bring to bear against her its vast resources in land
strength so long as it lacked sea power.
Thereafter, Great Britain recognized it as her cardinal pol
icy to pr�vent the rise on the continent of a single dominant power
that might some day utilize the far greater resources of Europe
to outbuild · her at sea. Britain steadfastly pursued this policy
6
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right up until World War II, employing the weight of her in
fluence and the pressure of her sea power to intervene in Europe
and so preserve the balance of power on the Continent.
Today, the cycle has reached full turn. A single con
tinental power has arisen in Europe that threatens to exclude the
Western democracies from the Eurasian Continent. That power

is opposed by a complex of States that rim the Atlantic Ocean. The
backbone of that complex is the sea power of Great Britain and the
United States, upon which all the rest depends. Except for its sub
marine arm--of which more later-the naval strength of the con
tinental power is not great enough to make a serious bid for com
mand of the seas.

This state of affairs has created in the minds of many per
sons a dangerous misconception-some of whom, indeed, may be

responsible for the formulation of our national strategy.

That

misconception is that sea power cannot be fully effective unless it is
opposed by sea power, weapon for weapon. The belief is widely
held that if the Soviets do not have capital ships, then we do not
need them; if they lack the striking power of carrier air, then

this weapon has no place in our arsenal; and that it is sufficient
simply to counter our opponent where he can strike us at sea,
namely, by defeating his submarine fleet.

truth.

I assure you, gentlemen, nothing could be farther from the
As I have said before, the Mission of the Navy in war can

be reduced to a very plain statement:

to make safe for our use the
sea lanes we need and to deny to the enemy the sea lanes he must
use to fight the war against us. Out of this simple Mission grows

a multitude of tasks that require the use of many weapons. i:t will

be my purpose here to state those tasks to you and to demonstrate
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how the Navy can-and, I trust, will-carry out those tasks jf an
other war is forced upon us.
It is helpful, I think, when reviewing our overall strategic
situation, to hold in mind a polar projection of the northern hemis
phere centered somewhere near Moscow. The European penin
sula is adjacent on the north, west, and south to waters of the At
lantic, or waters tributary to it. To the southward of the Eura
sian land mass, the Persian Gulf knifes in from the Indian Ocean
to a point within a thousand air miles of Soviet industrial centers
in the Caucausus and on the Caspian Sea. To the east, Siberia and
China front the Pacific Ocean. Wherever the coasts of Europe and
Asia meet the sea, Soviet power stops and ours begins. Thanks to
Anglo-American sea-air power, the broad surface of the seas is
denied to the enemy and is open to our use so long as we are able
to defend our shipping from the enemy's submarines and his
land-based air.
At the present time, as you well know, we hold important
strategic positions around the Eurasian continent from which our
military strength could be projected against the Soviet Union. At
the outset of any war, we shall hold an important lodgment in
Western Europe. Whether we can successfully maintain a foot
hold on the continent of Europe against the full weight of Soviet
land power must, of course, be determined by the event. We
believe that we can do so; and we are making heavy investments in
the Atlantic Pact nations to make that expectation a reality.
Outside the continental limits of Europe and Asia, we are estab
lished in the British Isles, in other islands of the Atlantic, in
north and east Africa, and at scattered points along the fringes
of central and southeast Asia. We face the Soviets in eastern
Asia and in the Japanese Islands and Okinawa.
8
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Thus, the entire Eurasian land mass is ringed by a serie-J
of positions from which heavy blows could be directed anywhere
against objectives on the Continent. In this situation there is dem
onstrated the classic weakness of a strong land power opposed by a
sea power having limited land strength. The land power cannot
invade the territory of its opponent since it cannot transport its
ground forces overseas. Although it may strike its enemy through
the air, and indeed deal him fearsome blows, it cannot make their
final by the ultimate invasion of his homeland. When ranged
against a strong sea power, the land power can gain at the most
only a stalemate. With this it must be content, since the oceans re
main an effective barrier against the movement of troops in great
force.
Not so, the sea power. The flexibility of action that is af
forded by control of the seas permits the sea power to deliver its
main thrust--or a series of thrusts-from any direction. The
enemy cannot be strong everywhere, and he cannot know forcer
tain from whence the blow may fall. By the economy of the
limited force that is available to it, the power that commands the
sea can direct that force so as to obtain its maximum effect.
These principles apply whether the force used be strictly
carrier strikes on coastal objectives, long-range strategic air at
tacks from peripheral bases, or amphibious invasion. Although
the continental power retains the advantage of interior lines, they
may prove of little value if its forces are over-extended and cannot
be transported in time to meet the threatened attack.
It would seem, therefore, that our basic strategy, in the case
of a war against the Soviets, would be to preserve the sort of a
condition I have just described. If we are ultimately to inter
vene with ground troops on the continent of Europe-and it appears
inevitable that we would have to do so-then such an intervenRESTRICTED
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
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tion should be made only after the enemy has been seriously w�kened by blows delivered with sea and air weapons from peripheral
bases.
It would be unwise to the point of folly, however, to assume
that such a strategy is not apparent to our opponent or that, he
will not do everything in his power to nullify it, if and when he,
cides upon war. Having recognized that strategic air attacks m�y
be carried out from advanced Allied positions against his in
dustry and communications, it may well be that the enemy's first
move in the event of war will be to capture or neutralize these
positions.

�r .

This, he has the capability of doing. True enough, the
Soviets could neither hold nor support overseas positions in _the
face of the pressure we could ultimately bring against their com
munications, but, for a time, an initial move of this sort might
have desirable effects. Such an opening move could conceivably
take the form of an. atomic blitz against Britain, coupled with air
borne and air-supported attacks on Iceland and our North AfriGan
positions. In such a case, the effect of any pla:qned retaliatory blow
would be seriously reduced. We would be for�ed to rely on North
American bases and such advanced bases as we might continue
to hold for the support of an initial strategic bomber offensive.
Thereafter, we would be faced with a long, uphill pull to re-estab
lish our forces at locations close enough to enemy targets to make
the employment of our air power both effective and profitable.
It will be clearly apparent to you that the support and reten
tion of overseas bases will depend upon the ability of the fleet to
keep open the lines of communications with those bases. The en
emy will have at his disposal two primary weapons to prevent
our doing so. One of these is the submarine; the other is land-based
10
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air, where it can be brought within range of the sea routes our

ships must use.

As to the submarine, it is gratifying to observe the attention

that is now being given to that problem and to note the agreement
so widely reached that we must make a major effort toward its
solution.

Although I am unable to say to you that any final solu

tion is as yet in sight, the means of detection and the weapons
for use against the submarine are well in advance of those available

at the end of the last war.

There is a tendency, I fear, on the part of the public-and

some members of the military-to over-emphasize the potentialities

of the submarine and to overlook some basic disadvantages attend

ant on its use as a primary weapon in the war at sea.

The submarine is, fundamentally, a weapon of the "guerre

de course".

Commerce raiding has held a fascination for weaker

naval powers throughout the history of naval warfare because of
its cheapness.

But it has never decided the issue in a major war.

The British tried it themselves in the Anglo-Dutch War, when

Charles II sought to gain a cheap victory over the Dutch and their
French allies by preying on their commerce.

This war ended, how

ever, with a fleet of Dutch ships in the mouth of the Thames.

During the war of the Spanish succession, the French devoted all

their efforts at sea to the raiding of British commerce.

Although

the British lost hundreds of ships, their trade increased neverthe

less, and French shipping all but disappeared from the seas. Mahan
roundly condemned commerce raiding as a poor substitute for
fleet action.

His studious disciples, the Germans, placed primary

reliance upon it as a means of naval warfare in both World Wars.

Today, we have not yet found completely satisfactory meth

ods of combating the most advanced types of submarines.

RESTRICTED
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is by no means clear that the Soviets will be able to employ them
effectively against the opposition that even now we are able to
offer.
The task of the submarines has been greatly complicated
by new developments. As you know, the Germans found it neces
sary to give their submarine crews long and intensive training
periods in the Baltic in order to fit them for warfare against our

convoys in the Atlantic. The shortening of their training periods,
enforced upon the Germans during the latter stages of the war,
was a great source of apprehension to Admiral Doenitz. The sub
marine that we shall combat in the next war will require of its
crews even greater technical proficiency than was attained by our
recent enemies in the last. Whether or not they are capable of
attaining this skill only time will tell. We should not discount it
too much.

So far, we have developed no acceptable substitute for the con
voy nor for the "hunter-killer" tactics so effectively employed toward
the end of the last war. We have, however, improved both our
weapons and our techniques in the prosecution of these methods of
anti-submarine defense. And other methods now under research
and development give even greater promise of a final answer to the
submarine problem.

But convoy and passive protection of shipping alone is not
enough. In the first instance, it surrenders to the enemy the initia
tive and leaves him free to devise new methods of attack when old
ones have failed. In the second, it forces upon us the need to pro

vide shipping with greater and greater protection as enemy offen
sive measures become more effective. And, finally, it permits the
enemy to increase the size of his concentrations against us, since
passive defense has no effect on his ability to build more sub

marines.

12
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Therefore, as a corollary to convoy and "hunter-killer" cover,
we must take up the offensive against enemy submari�es before they
leave their ports. We have numerous means of doing this. Many
of them lie within the sphere of strategic bombing-particularly
those that embrace attacks on building and assembly yards. But as
the finished product nears the sea-when the fitting out and train
ing stage commences-then, it may be within the power of the
fleet to intervene.
We shall seek to prevent the enemy from testing his boats
and training his crews in sea areas that are adj.acent to the oceans.
We shall mine his harbors and their exits, both by aerial and
submarine laid mines. And we shall attack him from the air
while his undersea craft are still in their pens. All of these are
measures that not only may require the mobility and striking pow
er of shipborne air, but are measures also to which it is especially
adapted. It would, of course, be a mistaken and uneconomical use
of sea-air power to carry out an offensive of this nature where en
emy training areas, harbors, and bases are within the effective
cover of land-based air. But in regions inaccessible to land-based
aircraft capable of precision attack missions of this kind, aircraft
from carriers may well be th_e only weapon that can do the job.
As to the enemy's land-based air, we can expect it will be
employed against our merchantmen much the same as it was in
the last war. The Germans used long-range reconnaissance aircraft
to locate convoys at sea. When a convoy was found, the position
would be relayed by radio to submarines best disposed to attack.
Thus, it would seem that some form of aerial reconnaissance will be
necessary if Soviet submarines are to be employed advantageously.
This means we shall have to screen our convoys against being
scouted by the enemy's land-based air. It will not be an easy job
to do. Limited, close-in screening can be carried out from escort
RESTRICTED
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carriers, but, in view of the enemy's ability to install radar in his
scouting aircraft, it is highly doubtful if we will be able to conceal the location of our convoys.
An obvious alternative would be to destroy the) Ememy's re
connaissance aircraft at its coastal bases. In some instances, it
should be possible to do this by land-based air strikes, provided
their are friendly fields within range. Elsewhere, fast carrier task
force strikes will be the only means of getting at these air�raft. On
the whole, the maintenance of absolute control of the �ir above
convoy routes will be a .difficult task to accomplish because of the
inordinate effort required to screen shipping again�t lqi:tg-range
reconnaissance aircraft. It should be possible, however, to de
fend merchant convoys against direct attack by land-based planes
by the provision of escort carriers in waters where danger of en
emy air attack exists. In the narrow seas, withi:ri close range of
enemy air bases, heavy covering forces consisting of carriers and
gunfire ships will doubtless be required to fight the convoys through.
Our experience in the Mediterranean during the last war indicates,
however, that merchant convoys can be moved ih the presence of
strong land-based air, provided carrier-borne aircraft is supplied in
adequate strength.
This leads us to a consideration of the carrier task force as
the primary weapon of naval warfare. As you know, the fleet ac
tions of Midway and the Coral Sea marked the beginning of a new
era in naval warfare and confirmed the aircraft carrier as the real
capital ship of the future. It is the most powerful offensive weapon
we have. The big-gun ship has now assumed primarily the status
of a surface escort for the carrier, although it has other uses. As
the war in the Pacific progressed, the striking power of carrier
aircraft against objectives other than enemy fleets was forcibly
demonstrated. Indeed, so effective did carriers prove in securing

14
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local control of the air at heavily defended land targets that surface
operations until then conceived as impracticable were confidently
planned and successfully carried out.
The aircraft carrier derives its value from a number of tacti
cal qualities, but it possesses one feature that transcends all the
others: It is a mobile base that can be brought close enough to
enemy targets. to launch aircraft with their optimum fighting ca
pabilities unimpaired. Of course, the fact that carriers may be
concentrated, and thus multiply their effectiveness; that they may
be employed with surprise; that they may cruise for long periods
in distant waters; and that they have great flexibility as to the
targets against which they may be employed; all these, too, are
important. But the ability to operate aircraft at short ranges
which the carrier imparts-is the unique feature that is unmatched
in any other weapon of aerial warfare. The carrier sends up an
aircraft with a minimum fuel load compared to that of land planes
that must be launched from more distant bases. Hence, it can
devote a greater portion of its carrying capacity to offensive and
defensive weapons, and it can be employed with greater frequency
since it has a shorter distance to fly. These advantages combine to
increase the striking power of carrier aircraft, not directly with
the decrease in range to the target, but more on the order of a
geometrical proportion with the decrease in range.
All of these tactical features add up to provide for Allied
sea-air power a strategic advantage that cannot be offset by its
opponent. By means of air-sea task forces employed in adequate
strength, we should be able to overwhelm the enemy at any
point within reach of our carrier-borne aircraft. It is this ability
that has in the past permitted us to paralyze enemy defenses at
the end of a long overseas movement of amphibious forces. It is
this ability which, I trust, will in the future permit the support
RESTRICTED
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and retention of overseas positions we may need to drive the war
home to the enemy.
I think we may accept it as a sound military principle
that when one component of the nation's armed force has been as
signed a specific task, it should be free to investigate the nature
of that task against the background of its own peculiar talents and
experience. Only by this means will it be able competently to de
termine how best to do the job it has been given.
Now, the Navy has been allocated those tasks that require
the use of weapons peculiar to sea-air power. Nobody disputes
that. These tasks do not involve the direct participation of any
other service. One of them is to employ the striking power of
carrier-based air against certain enemy targets that can be
reached from the sea. Accordingly, the Navy has put its best
brains and its most experienced officers to work on the problem of
how most effectively to employ carrier-based air against the op
position we may expect in the future. This is a technical problem

that requires solution by persons who are by training and ex
perience intimately acquainted with all the factors involved. I think
you will agree that such knowledge and experience can best be ob

tained from within the Navy itself.

Briefly stated, it has been the result of the Navy's investi

gation of this problem that we cannot expect to overcome deter
mined opposition at all enemy targets that are vulnerable to sea

air attack unless we employ the most advanced types of aircraft
that are available to us. We are aware of developments in Soviet

aviation and along other lines of anti-aircraft defense. There can
be 110 doubt these measures would have a high degree of effect
iveness against the aircraft for which our present carriers were

built.

16
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But we, too, have made corresponding advances in the art
of aircraft design and construction. We can build planes today
that we believe will out-perform anything the Soviets will have
in the foreseea}?le future. These are the planes we will, need if
we are successfully to exploit the unique weapon of sea-air power.
Unfortunately, we cannot adapt our present-day carriers
which, as you know, were designed under conditions of the last

war-to the new high-performance aircraft without sacrificing some
of their most valuable performance qualities. The Navy should
be free to build the carriers it needs to carry and operate the planes
necessary for it to carry out.its mission.
We must, I feel, remain keenly alert to changing tactical
and technological conditions that dictate changes in strategic con
cepts. Hardly a month passed during the last war but what some
naval developnient, however minor, contributed its small influence
to large revisions in our strategic thinking.

One of the most · significant of these developments was the
operation of carrier task forces relatively independent of forward

bases. In past wars, the radius of action of naval forces was de
termined by the availability of bases-or at least of coaling sta
tions-in advanced areas where the fleet sought to operate. Bases
have traditionally been one of· the essential components since

fleets acquired freedom of mobility with the advent of steam. The
sea power of Great Britain was magnified an<l reinforced by heP
numerous naval stations in all the oceans of the world. Th.ese
bases made it possible for Britain to extend the range of her
. fleets; and they, in turn, depended on the Fleet for security and
protection against overseas attack. Until World War II, it was ac
cepted as axiomatic by naval strategists that no nation could aspire
to control of sea areas far distant from the homeland unless she
had access to bases in waters where the fleet was to, be employed;
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Today, that is changed. In World War II, we were faced;with
a situation in the Pacific that threatened severely to limit ,�he
striking power of the naval weapon. We lacked· bases in waters
where we hadto carry the fight to the enemy. So we made our bases
mobile, and we took them where we pleased. As a result, our fleets
are today virtually independent of overseas bases. The flexibility
of the sea�air weapon has been multiplied, and for limited periods

we are able to bring to bear the full striking power of the Fleet in
waters wherever ships can sail.

The strategic implications of this naval development I ani
sure are not lost on you. What we are now able to -do is to bring to
bear the full strength of our sea-air power where and when we wish
and to maintain the pressure for prolonged periods of time.

Of course, advanced bases still are of great value. They
serve two main purposes. First, we need locations in forward areas
where we can send ships for repair of battle damage that would
otherwise require a long trip to shipyards in the rear, !:1-nd we need
them also to patch up heavily damaged ships so that the voyage
home may be made in safety. Secondly, we need advanced ports
where stores and ammunition can be transferred from incoming
cargo ships to the specially constructed logistics ships that. work in
the fleet. But neither of these functions requires an establishment
on shore. The facilities needed for the operation of an advanced base,
including major ship repair, may be entirely waterborne. Thus,
any protected anchorage favorably situated with respect to the zone
of combat may be placed into use as a floating base just as soon
as the specialized logistics ships can be brought forward.

Now, before closing, I want to touch briefly on the atomic
bomb and what it means to the future of naval warfare. I think

it is safe to say that nuclear fission has had an impact on existing
theories of warfare more severe than any other new weapon in his-
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tory. It has radically disturbed our pre-conceived notions involving
the disposition of forces and the principles of concentration and
mass. Paradoxically enough, we, who first developed the bomb,
have suffered most by the upsets it has produced in the technique
of warfare.
Our military experience in World War II was gained at
enormous cost. In the field of naval warfare, we 'battled our way
slowly and painfully from Pearl Harbor to Okinawa, meanwhile
gai_ning a "know-how" in the use of naval weapons that is un
matched by any nation in the world. But at the very end of the
war a new, more powerful weapon appeared that now threatens
to undo much of what we have learned.
The influence atomic weapons will have on maritime strategy,
however, is not yet clearly defined. For the present, we must ad
just ourselves to this situation just as we have in the past, when
�ew means of attack have seemed to render obsolete ships and
weapons then . in use. Naval· history is replete with instances
where some new weapan has threatened to make the ship no long
er an effective instrument for controlling the seas. When the ex
plosive shell supplanted a solid shot for use against the wooden man
of-war, . pessimistic observers were convinced great ships could
never stand up against this. terrible new weapon. But shortly
afterward, the ironclad ship made its appearance; and sea control
continued to be exercised, as U�\lal, by the · Power having the
largest fleet of heavy ships. When the Whitehead torpedo was
introduced, it seemed evident the death of the capital ship was
at hand. So convinced were the French of this fact that they
temporarily gave up the building of large ships in favor o� small
torpedo boats, each able to launch a lethal attack upon a battle
ship. But it turned out that these small craft could reach their
targets only under favorable conditions of sea and weather, and
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that they were highly vulnerable to the defensive fire of their
ponderous opponents. Moreover, improvements in underwater pro
tection tended to redress the balance in favor of the ship. With
the advent of the airplane, it appeared certain to most advocates

of air power that large ships would become easy prey to aircraft
able to launch against them bombs weighing five hundred or a
thousand pounds. Instead, the present day capital ship-with its

powerful anti-aircraft weapons, under radar control and firing in

fluence-fuzed shells augmented by its own air coverage-has be
come an extremely tough target, even to large flights of aircraft.
And so it goes.

I think the lesson to be learned here was

best expressed by Mahan when he cautioned against being too

quick in discarding the old as well as too slow in adopting the new.

We know, of course, that a single atomic bomb will destroy

a single ship. But we know also that fighting ships underway and

suitably dispersed will suffer but slightly from an atomic explosion,
except by direct hit.

This would seem to make the use of atomic

bombs against mobile forces extremely doubtful.

On the other hand, heavy concentration of ships in ports or

amphibious operations might offer suitable and worthwhile targets.
The present answer seems to be greater dispersion and control of
the air over the vital areas.

It

is not beyond reason that we shall

in the future evolve a defense against the atomic bomb that will

prove effective.

Now as to push button warfare, including rockets, jet pro

pelled bombs, guided missiles, etc., fortunately, the solution of that

problem seems very remote. At best they probably will never be pre

cision weapons and whether or not they will be used against mo
bile naval forces is problematical. As you know, counter measures
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are being devised but have not yet been overly successful. It is a
problem which is of vital importance to all the armed services.
In conclusion, gentlemen, if there is one single thought I
should like to leave with you, it is this: Command of the sea is

vital to us in war. I think that summarizes all I have- had to say.
Unless we have command of the sea, our war-making force must re

main based within our continental borders. Without it, we cannot

support our allies, and we shall be left to face the enemy alone.

It is the job of the Navy to provide that command. The
Navy by itself cannot win a war. But the Navy alone can create
conditions without which victory cannot be possible.
Those
conditions are these: to make safe for our use the sea lanes we

-need and to deny to the enemy the S!ea lanes he must use to
fight the war against us.
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